

Algebraic Cryptanalysis of STARK-Friendly JARVIS and FRIDAY

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
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Design

- JARVIS: block cipher, FRIDAY: hash function
- Primitives proposed by T. Ashur and S. Dhooge [AD18]
- Goal: efficiency in STARK setting
- Some security arguments borrowed from the AES

Design cont.

- Very similar in structure to MiMC [Alb+16]:



- $S(x) = x^{2^n-2}$
- Affine polynomials B, C of degree 4
- 10-14 rounds (depending on block size)

Attack Idea

- Exploit two facts:
 - Low degree of affine polynomials B and C
 - $\forall x \neq 0 : x^{2^n-2} = x^{-1}, y = x^{-1} \implies xy = 1$
 - Procedure:
 1. Describe round from both sides and connect S-box parts with degree-2 equation
 2. Compute a Gröbner basis and solve for the unknown variables (round keys...)

Equation System

- Intermediate variable for every second round (after optimization)
- Every round key a linear function of the master key
- System for e.g. FRIDAY (assume r even):
 - $n_e = \frac{r}{2}$ equations of degree 32
 - $n_v = \frac{r}{2}$ variables

Results on FRIDAY

Generic formula for complexity estimation and setting linear algebra constant to $\omega = 2$:

r	n_v	D_{reg}	Security level
10 (JARVIS-128)	5	156	59 bits
12 (JARVIS-192)	6	187	72 bits
14 (JARVIS-256)	7	218	85 bits
40	20	621	250 bits

Full results + practical verification to be published soon™!